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This paper investigates the existence of an optimal cash level, speed of adjustment, and cash holding determinants. The threshold regression and dynamic model were used in this study on four MENA
countries from 2007 to 2018. The findings show there is a nonlinear relationship between cash level
and firm’s value which is consistent with the trade-off theory. Furthermore, our study confirms that
firms holding cash above the optimal level of having a lower speed of adjustment than the firms with
cash levels below the optimal level with size, growth, and net-working capital being key corporate
cash determinants. Our results extend the theoretical implications of the trade-off theory to MENA
countries and would help corporate policymakers to adjust their cash levels within the thresholds’
levels to maximize their firm value.
Keywords: Cash holding; MENA region; Threshold regression; Trade-off.
JEL Classification: G32

Introduction
It has become crucial within the corporate
finance literature to study the cash behavior
of companies. The manner by which companies tend to spend their cash and whether
those companies target an optimal cash value
will give more insights on how they seize external opportunities and remedy their internal
conflicts. Major companies like Berkshire Hathaway have built-up a cash pile of more than
USD125 billion by the end of December 2019
which raises many questions about why and for
what purpose cash holdings are being built-up
(Mohamed, 2020).
The most simplistic way to think about cash
level is by making a balance between the benefits and costs of cash holding (Kim et al., 1998).

Eventually, the optimal shall be reached when
an additional unit of cash offsets its benefit.
Furthermore, the variable of firm value is very
important as the ultimate goal of a corporate
manager would be firm value maximization. On
one hand, the benefits of holding cash are mainly to secure financing for the firm’s transactions
and investment plans. On the other hand, the
main cost of retaining cash is tax disadvantage
and opportunity costs related to the unproductive nature of cash (Tahir et al., 2016).
One of the earlier discussions on cash holding was reported by Keynes (1936) with the
liquidity preference theory which can explain
most the corporate behavior around the cash
variable. Keynes states that people hold money
for three reasons: to cover their basic transactions (transaction motive), to hedge against un-
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expected events (precautionary motive), and to
take benefit if the price would fall (speculation
motive). However, the precautionary motive
has become obsolete due to today’s technological and financial improvements. Indeed, firms
can now manage easily against all types of risks
and firms can relatively secure financing to
meet their basic transaction need. The Modigliani & Miller’s theorem refutes the transaction
motive as companies can easily go to capital
markets to finance their profitable investment
projects at negligible transaction costs (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Similarly, the transaction cost does not hold for large companies as
these transaction costs tend to be offset by the
economies of scale (Mulligan, 1997).
Beside Keynes’ work, many theories have
tried to explain the corporate cash behavior
through studying its optimal, deviation from
this optimal and what determines the cash holding. Jensen (1986) agency theory serves as a
good theoretical background for cash holding when companies started accumulating
large amounts of cash in their balance sheets.
It would be expected, according to the agency
theory, that companies would retain more cash
in the absence of good investment opportunities
and managers decide not to return the cash to
the shareholders. Nevertheless, the continuous
trend to stock a huge pile of cash by companies
has led to raising other factors to explain corporate cash levels.
In addition to that, there is also a tax motive
that affects the cash level in firms. Indeed, companies facing high taxation on foreign earnings
tend to hold more cash than nationwide companies. Thus, empirical studies have found various standardized cash levels among companies
across different capital markets which indicate
the existence of a targeted level that serves the
value maximization purpose (Dittmar & MahrtSmith, 2007; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Gunney
et al., 2003; Kalcheva & Lins, 2003).
Hence, the reason to study optimal cash level is important in order to provide both managers and shareholders with a proxy level by
which the firm’s value is maximized. Also, Jensen (1986) affirms that when managers have
access to excess cash-flows they tend to waste
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it on value-destroying activities such as empire
building. On the other hand, Liedgren & Carlsson (2009) reports that firms holding too much
cash can also become targets for activist investors or LBO-transactions.
One of the main problems facing corporate
cash studies in emerging countries is the weak
corporate governance framework. Indeed, it is
found that the relationship between cash levels
and firm value in countries with poor investor
protection is much weaker than in developed
countries (Opler et al., 2001; Pinkowitz et al.,
2006). Our paper contributes to the literature
on cash holding decisions of firms on several
grounds. First, fewer studies have investigated
the cash holding behavior in emerging countries which will give another perspective on
these countries through our study on the MENA
and will offer more explicit evidence to support
the trade-off theory.
Previous studies in the MENA region have
investigated the relationship between corporate
governance and cash holding. To the best of our
knowledge, there has not been a study on how
MENA countries adjust their corporate cash
holding and what optimal level do they target.
Indeed, the reason we chose MENA countries
relate to the fact that corporate cash holding is
poorly investigated in these countries as a bloc.
Additionally, corporate cash holding in developing countries is an important issue to study
as political and economic instability weights on
corporate managers to adjust their cash holdings under these constraints. Indeed, countries
with poor investors’ protection deviate from the
common established theory of cash and firm
value relationship. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) confirm that the relation between cash holding and
firm value is absent in those countries. Hence,
this paper aims to bridge the empirical gap in
this region by providing an empirical overview
on the cash decision in the MENA region.
Moreover, our paper make use of a nonlinear model to estimate the optimal cash level which defines more relevantly the concave
function between cash and firm value. Indeed,
previous studies (Azmat, 2014; Guangming &
Fang, 2013; Siddiqua et al., 2019) have a linear
regression model to estimate the optimal level.
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Hence, the use of a threshold regression would
give more insights on the optimal cash level in
MENA countries. Using both the threshold regression to estimate the optimal level and a dynamic model to analyze partial adjustment, our
paper would then give a general overview on
corporate cash holdings decision in the MENA
region.
The first section will present a brief literature
review on past corporate cash holding studies.
The following section will introduce our data
and research design. Finally, results and discussion will be presented in the third section.

Literature Review
In the presence of a frictionless world, the
absence of liquidity premiums and taxes would
be pointless for firms. Hence, corporate cash
decisions would be irrelevant as they will not
affect the firm’s value (Opler et al., 2001). Nevertheless, market imperfections experienced in
practice would imply that an optimal cash level
exists that maximizes the firm’s value. The optimal level stands at the point where the marginal cost of cash matches the marginal benefits
of cash (Martinez-Sola et al., 2013).
The corporate finance literature has dedicated
much attention in recent years to study corporate
cash behavior and its effect on the firm’s value
(Ashhari & Faizal, 2018; Tong, 2011; Zhang &
Ling, 2016). The first papers to study corporate
cash have assumed that an optimal level of
cash exists and that companies tend to adjust
their levels (Kim et al., 1998; Martinez-Sola et
al., 2013; Opler et al., 2001; Ozkan & Ozkan,
2004). Four main theories have addressed the
issue of cash holding: information asymmetries, agency costs, and the transaction model.
The existence of information asymmetry
between creditors and debtors implies that
firms will retain more cash to cover for their
investment plans. Indeed, the problems of
adverse selection will make it difficult for firms
to raise external funds. Pecking order theory
explains that firms in this case will make a
hierarchy in their financing by using internal
funds before appealing for markets (Myers &
Majluf, 1984). As for the cost of holding cash,
50
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the problem of under-investment caused by the
same information asymmetry can be offset by
using retained cash to finance risky investment
(Martinez-Sola et al., 2013). In addition to that,
growth companies are expected to hold more
cash to finance their projects. The case where
these companies have high bankruptcy costs
implies that they need to hold more cash to
avoid financial distress (Harris & Raviv, 2008;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
Additionally, cash holding might raise
agency problems between shareholders and
managers when the latter chose to finance valuedestroying projects instead of returning cash
to shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
In fact, managers would retain cash either to
pursue their own objectives or to avoid market
discipline through takeovers for example.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) reported that when
shareholders are mainly independent, the likelihood of takeovers on the firms becomes easy
encouraging managers to build considerable
cash holding. This situation creates an adverse
effect on the firm as every dollar of cash retained
would increase the firm’s value by less than one
dollar (Opler et al., 1999). As stated before, the
fact that growth companies tend to hold more
cash is also related to the existence of agency
costs. These companies are often presented
with risky investment and greater growth
opportunities which make external funding
expensive for them (Myers, 1977).
Opler et al. (1999) give much insight into
Keynes’ transaction model for cash. They show
that the existence of an optimal cash level comes
from the fact that in order for firms to raise
outside funds, they must face transaction costs
in the form of fixed and proportionate costs.
Thus, this must be undertaken by liquidating
assets, cutting investment, or dividends to pay
for these costs. Consequently, the optimal level
is achieved when the marginal costs of holding
costs i.e. lower pecuniary return and the benefit
of holding cash i.e. seize the opportunity to
access external funding with lower costs. In
addition to that, holding cash becomes crucial
for specialized firms with firm-specific assets
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Indeed, for such
firms, it becomes hard to raise funds through
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asset selling in comparison to well-diversified
firms with assets to sell.
Consequently, holding cash raises two
mainstream discussions among academic
literature; firms can either hold cash to pass
over markets in financing their investments
plan or holding excess cash might lead to
conflicts and distorted behavior form managers
against shareholders. This raises the issue
of the firm’s adjustment to meet the optimal
level. Indeed, firms are expected to undertake
adjustment movement downward or upward to
keep their cash holding within the optimal level.
Accordingly, firms with higher levels of cash
holdings have a higher speed of adjustment than
firms with cash deficiency (Jiang & Lie, 2016).
Additionally, Rehman et al. (2016) suggest that
the speed of adjustment downward is much
higher than upward adjustment. Firms would
have more to bring down their cash levels like
loan payments or dividends along with lower
costs associated with this adjustment.
In relation to previous empirical studies
on optimal cash holding, Opler et al. (1999)
conduct one of the first empirical studies on
the US market which confirm the existence of
an optimal cash level. Similarly, Tong (2011)
investigates the optimal level on US firms and
report that deviation from the optimal cash level
reduces the value of cash to shareholders which
is consistent with the trade-off theory. Likewise, previous studies like (Azmat, 2014; Martinez-Sola & Garcia-Teruel, 2011; T. Nguyen et
al., 2016), confirm that a nonlinear relationship
exists between cash and firm’s performance.
Accordingly, the trade-off theoretical framework stipulates the existence of an optimal cash
level. Hence, the first research hypothesis shall
be formulated as follow:
(H1): A nonlinear relationship exists between
cash holdings and firm’s performance
amongst MENA region listed non-financial companies.
Numerous studies have investigated cash
holding and partial adjustment in developing
countries. Lian et al. (2012) carried out research
on the Chinese market and reported that asymmetric adjustments are made to the optimal
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol13/iss1/4
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level. Moreover, firms rely on debt and equity
financing to fill their cash shortages to meet the
optimal level. Similarly, Siddiqua et al. (2019)
conducted a study on the Pakistani market using
a dynamic model. They found that firms adjust
their cash holding toward the optimal level and
that firms with levels above the optimal tend to
have higher adjustment speed. Azmat (2014)
prove that an optimal cash holding exists using a
dynamic-model in the Pakistani market and that
a deviation from this optimum affects firm value
negatively. Venkiteshwaran (2011) conducted a
study on US firms investigating their partial adjustment toward their optimal cash level. He reports that firms rapidly correct towards their optimal levels which can be brought to two years.
This shows that companies do target an optimal
cash level that maximizes their value. Cahyono
et al. (2019) explored the optimal cash holding
speed adjustments among Indonesian firms and
found that any deviation from the optimal cash
negatively affects the firm’s value and that investment, managerial ownership, institutional
ownership, and debt moderate this adjustment.
Thus, as previous empirical studies like (Lian et
al., 2012; T. L. H. Nguyen et al., 2016; Siddiqua
et al., 2019; Venkiteshwaran, 2011) have confirmed the existence pf dynamic adjustment of
firms toward the optimal level with firms having asymmetric adjustment speed, we develop
the following hypothesis:
(H2): There is an adjustment speed by firms toward their optimal cash holding.

Research Methods
In order to estimate the optimal level of cash
holding, a simplistic way of doing so is determined by a trade-off between costs and benefits
of having liquid assets to derive an optimal cash
level (Kim et al., 1998). The optimal cash level
should be the point where marginal costs of cash
just offset the marginal benefits (Martinez-sola,
2013). In order to do this, a threshold regression
model will be employed to conduct our study.
The reason for choosing the threshold regression model relates to the heterogeneity problems in panel data. The classical fixed effect or
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Table 1. Variable Description
Variable
Cash
Size
Growth
ROA
NWC
Lev
CAPEX

Proxy
Cash and equivalent divided by total assets
Natural Logarithm of total assets
Annual growth rate of sales
Operating income of total assets
Net working capital is measured by taking the difference of current assets and current liabilities on total assets
Leverage is measured as total debt on total book value of equity
Capital expenditure is the ratio of firm’s total capital expenditure to firm’s total assets

Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

random effect reflects only the heterogeneity in
intercepts. Hence, Hansen (1999) proposes a
panel threshold model to solve this problem and
creates new insights for economic policy and
financial analysis. Though threshold models are
familiar in time-series analysis, their use with
panel data has been limited (Wang, 2015). Our
use for this model will serve to catch the nonlinear feature of cash holding with the firm’s
value.
Before presenting our model, Table 1 details
variables used in both the threshold and dynamic model.
The general presentation of the model in relation to our case of study can be expressed as
follow:

asymptotic distribution of F1 is non-standard,
the authors use the procedure of bootstrap to
construct the critical values and P-value. If a
threshold effect exists which is equal to H0: β1
≠ β2, the authors should test for the asymptotic
distribution of threshold estimate, H0: γ = γ0,
and adopt the likelihood ratio test: LR1=(S1(γ)−
S1( ))/ 2 with the asymptotic confidence inter).
vals: c(α) = −2log(1−
If there is a double threshold, the model can
be modified as follow:

(2)
(1)
Where θ’=(θ1, θ2, θ3) are the estimated regression coefficients and Hit=(Sizeit, Growthit, LEVit)
and ROA (Return on Total assets) represents
the proxy for firm’s performance. CASH is an
explanatory variable and the threshold variable.
Control variables were selected to be the size,
the company growth and the company leverage.
The γ is the threshold value and εit is the error,
assumed to be independent and normally distributed.
In order to run our threshold regression, we
should test first the null hypothesis of no threshold effect, H0: β1 = β2 based on the likelihood ratio test: F1=(S0−S1( ))/ 2, where S0 and S1 are
sum of squared errors under null and alternative hypothesis, respectively. However, as the
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The original static model derived from the
earlier work of Opler et al. (1999) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006), the cash holding determinants
equation can be expressed as follow:
Cashit* = δ0+β1NWCit+β2SIZEit+β3Growthit
+ β4LEVit+β5CAPEXit+ηi+λt+vit (3)
The star in the term Cash denotes the equilibrium or the optimal level expressed by the fitted
line of the equation. Taking into consideration
that cash adjustment toward the optimal level
takes time through a partial adjustment process,
the cash dynamic can then be expressed as follow:
Cashit−Cashit−1 = γ(Cashit*−Cashit−1)+δit

(4)

5
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variables
ROA
CASH
SIZE
SG
LEV
NWC
CAPEX

Observations
1152
1152
1152
1152
1152
1056
1056

Mean
3.1561
0.0779
11.2320
0.8873
1.5841
1.7728
0.3441

Median
1.3243
0.0385
10.9571
0.0369
0.1209
0.2559
0.3178

SD
10.3163
0.1069
1.5962
15.9731
13.6679
8.6090
0.2351

Min
-56.1426
0.0000
7.7417
-44.1787
-134.9396
-42.1854
0.0002

Max
78.9852
0.6973
15.8203
445.3806
318.5263
86.0745
0.9057

Note: ROA represents company performance; CASH represents the percentage of cash held by the company; SIZE represents company
size; SG represents company growth; LEV represents company leverage. NWC represents net working capital. CAPEX represents capital
expenditure.
Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

Table 3. Unit Root Test Results
Variables
ROA
CASH
SIZE
SG
LEV
NWC
CAPEX

LLC
t-statistic
−13.0998
−1.0e+02
−3.0145
−1.3e+02
−3.4467
−16.6176
−6.4275

IPS
P-value
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0013
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0003
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000

z-statistic
−7.4723
−8.5102
−3.9788
−12.761
−8.7616
−4.8337
−2.6212

P-value
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000
*** 0.0044

Note: LLC and IPS are unit root tests of Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003)
respectively. *** indicates significance at 1%.
Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

By replacing the value of Cashit* in Equation
(2) by the expression above, we get the following model:
Cashit = β0γ+(1−γ)Cashit−1+γβ1NWCit
+γβ2SIZEit+γβ3Growthit+γβ4LEVit
+γβ5CAPEXit+ηi+λt+vit

(5)

By simplification, equation (5) can be written as follow:
Cashit = α+ρCashit−1+δ1NWCit+δ2 SIZEit
+δ3Growthit+δ4LEVit+δ5CAPEXit
+ηi+λt+vit

(6)

Where α=γδ0; ρ=(1−γ); δk=γβk; vit=γεit; The
variable ηi is the unobservable heterogeneity
or the firm’s unobservable individual effects.
The variable λt is a time dummy that changes in
time but is equal for all firms in each of the time
periods considered. Finally, parameters vit are
random disturbances. A two-step generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator will be
used to resolve the issue of endogeneity and to
estimate Equation (6).
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Our data is retrieved from the DataStream
database from the annual financial statements
of active non-financial firms from 2007 till
2018. With this sampling method, data collected includes 96 non-financial companies
after cleaning our data for any missing values
and for companies newly listed on the stock exchange. In addition to that, some firms within
our sample have negative book value of equity.
We have proceeded to clean the data accordingly from negative equity values along with
abnormal values using Winsor technique at 1%.

Results and Discussions
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 below presents descriptive statistics
for the variables in the model. The results show
that the average ROA on the MENA region is
3.16%, meaning that for each dollar used, the
company is able to generate USD0.03 in operating income. The mean value for cash is 8%
with the standard deviation of 10,6%. The average leverage ratio of our sample is quite high
at 158% with the standard deviation of 8.63.
53
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Table 4. Test Results of Threshold Effect of Cash Holding Ratio on Firm’s Performance
Threshold value
Single-threshold test
0.2588
Double-threshold test
0.0068
0.2588
Triple-threshold test
0.0068
0.1406
0.2588

F-statistic

P-value

1%

Test critical values
5%

10%

19.0196

0.06*

49.3888

21.6447

17.4163

17.2577

0.01***

15.4895

12.4517

11.3720

9.0181

0.18

24.8206

14.2873

11.2817

F-statistic

Note: F-statistics and P-value were obtained by executing a repeating bootstrap procedure 100 times for each bootstrap test. *** indicates
significance at 1%; * indicates significance at 10%.
Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

Table 5. Estimated Results of Regression Coefficient for Cash Holding Ratio
Coefficients
β1
β2
β3

Estimated value
-22.7716
44.1679
19.4585

OLS SE
17.0066
5.3276
4.4196

White SE
11.8349
9.1323
4.9836

tOLS
-1.3390
8.2903***
4.4028***

tWhite
-1.9241*
4.8364***
3.9045***

Note: β1, β2 and β3 are the coefficients of the cash holding ratio variable corresponding to each value of the threshold. *** indicates
significance at 1%; * indicates significance at 10%.
Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

The average growth rate of operating sales is
89% and size by the average log of total assets
is 11.23. Average value for net working capital
is 1.77 with a standard deviation of 8.61. The
mean value for capital expenditure is 0.34 with
a standard deviation of 0.24.
Unit Root Test Results
The threshold regression model requires that
all variables should be stationary to avoid spurious regression. We have used Levin et al. (2002)
and Im et al. (2003) tests to check for unit root.
The results are shown in table 3 below. According to both test, all variables are stationary and
statistically significant at 1%.
Test results of threshold effect of cash holding ratio on firm’s performance
We have used GAUSS software to estimate
our model and applied bootstrap to obtain the
F-statistics and the p-values. Hence, table 4
shows the results of single-threshold, doublethreshold and triple-threshold tests.
We have first examined for the existence of
a single-threshold, we obtained F-statistics and
p-value of 19.0196 and 0.06 (>5%), respective-
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ly. We have then rejected the null hypothesis
at the level of 5%. Similarly, we examined the
existence of a double-threshold and obtained
an F-statistics and p-value of 17.2577 and 0.01
(≤1%). The results suggest that that existence
of a double-threshold is confirmed and statistically significant at 1%. Finally, the hypothesis
of a triple-threshold is rejected as F-statistics
and p-value are 9.0181 and 0.18 (>10%), respectively.
Thus, our results show that a double-threshold exists and significant at 1%. The values of
our thresholds are 0.0068 and 0.2588. The firststep threshold occurs at 0.0068 and then the
second-step threshold occurs at 0.2588 which
divides our sample into three regions.
Table 5 shows the estimated coefficient,
standard deviations according to the OLS and
White methods. Our results show that all coefficients are statistically significant for the three
regions of our model.
When the Cash is smaller than 0.68%,
the proxy for the firm’s value will decrease
by 22.77% when the cash increases by 1%.
Similarly, the ROA will increase by 44.17%
when the cash value increases by 1% between
0.68% and 25.88%. Eventually, the ROA will
increase by 19.46% if the cash increases by 1%

7
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Table 6. Estimated Results of Coefficients for Control Variables
Coefficients
θ1
θ2
θ3

Estimated value
0.0444
2.1584
-0.1187

OLS SE
0.0159
0.9520
0.0194

White SE
0.0110
1.1323
0.0449

tOLS
2.8006***
2.2672***
-6.1021***

tWhite
4.0482***
1.9062*
-2.6444***

Note: θ1, θ2 and θ3 are the estimated coefficients of company’s size (SIZE), company’s growth (SG), and leverage (LEV). *** indicates
significance at 1%; * indicates significance at 10%.
Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

Table 7. Number of Companies in Each Threshold by Year
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total

CASHi,t of ≤ 0.68%
Number
Percentage (%)
13
14%
13
14%
21
22%
18
19%
21
22%
19
20%
25
26%
24
25%
28
29%
21
22%
26
27%
21
22%
250
22%

0.68% < CASHi,t of ≤ 25.88%
Number
Percentage (%)
72
75%
76
79%
69
72%
74
77%
70
73%
71
74%
66
69%
65
68%
63
66%
71
74%
64
67%
70
73%
831
72%

CASHi,t of > 25.88%
Number
Percentage (%)
11
11%
7
7%
6
6%
4
4%
5
5%
6
6%
5
5%
7
7%
5
5%
4
4%
6
6%
5
5%
71
6%

Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

above the level of 25.88%.
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficient,
standard errors according to the OLS and White
method for our control variables. It shows that
all our variables (Size, Growth, and Leverage)
are statistically significant. Our results show
the estimated coefficient of the company’s size
(θ1) is 0.0444 indicate a positive relationship
with the ROA at 1% level which is consistent
with Abor (2005). The growth coefficient (θ2)
is 2.1584 at 1% level indicating a positive
relationship with the firm’s performance. This
results that growth is a factor in increasing
company’s efficiency which is consistent with
the findings of Abor (2005) and Nguyen (2019).
At the same time the estimated coefficient for
company’s leverage is -0.1187 and is inversely
related to ROA at 1% which is consistent with
the finding of (Abor, 2005; Vijayakumaran &
Atchyuthan, 2017).
From the above results, the estimated model
can be expressed as follow:
ROAi,t= μi+0.0444Sizei,t+2.1584Sgi,t −0.1187Levi,t
−22.7716Cashi,t I(Cashi,t ≤0.0068)

+44.1679Cashi,t I(0.068<Cashi,t ≤0.2588)
−19.4585Cashi,t I(Cashi,t ≤0.2588)+ei,t (6)
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol13/iss1/4
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v13i1.12840

Table 7 shows the number of companies at
each threshold level. Our results show over our
studied period, 22% of our companies are having a threshold of less than 0.68% (meaning that
about 13 to 28 companies fall into each year
under the first threshold). Similarly, 72% of
our companies fall into the second category of
having a threshold between 0.68% and 25.88%
(meaning that about 63–76 companies fall into
this threshold each year). At the same time, 6%
of the companies are having a cash level above
25.88% (meaning that about 4 to 11 companies
fall into each year under this threshold).
Determinants of the CASH and speed of
adjustment
Table 8 represents correlation between all
the variables of study. The last column corresponds to the variance inflation factor (VIF).
The results do not present any collinearity problem for multivariate analyses.
Arellano and Bond dynamic panel data
model (GMM) is used to estimate Equation (6).
Table 9 corresponds to the results of panel data
regression for overall firms and each threshold.
Results in table 9 show that firms within the
55
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Table 8. Correlation Matrix and VIF Test
CASH
NWC
SIZE
SG
LEV
CAPEX

CASH
1.0000
-0.0102
0.0101
-0.0045
-0.0384
*-0.1486

NWC

SIZE

1.0000
*-0.0734
-0.0167
*0.1818
-0.0273

1.0000
-0.0329
*0.0683
-0.0445

SG

1.0000
-0.0051
0.0020

LEV

1.0000
*-0.0709

CAPEX

VIF

1.0000

1.04
1.02
1.00
1.05
1.01

Note: CASH represents the percentage of cash held by the company. SIZE represents company size; SG represents company growth. LEV
represents company leverage. NWC represents net working capital. CAPEX represents capital expenditure.
Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

threshold level [0,68%:25.88%] have an adjustment rate toward the optimal level of 0.42
confirming the existence of partial adjustment
policy followed by these firms. The coefficient
of the lagged variable cash is 0.58 with a t-value of 76.72 which indicates that MENA region
firms target an optimal level of cash following
the trade-off theory.
In other terms, firms take 2.38 (1/0.42) year
to adjust for the optimal level. The delay in
adjusting their levels comes from the fact that
adjustment movements entail costs which halts
the immediate adjustment toward the optimal
level. These results are consistent with previous
studies by (Rehman et al., 2016; Siddiqua et al.,
2019).
On the other hand, both firms below and
above the threshold interval have a positive
and statistically significant lagged cash coefficient indicating the presence of trade-off behavior across symmetry. Hence, firms below the
threshold level (≤ 0.68%) have an adjustment
rate 0.79 lower than the adjustment rate for the
firms above the threshold level (> 25.88%).
Indeed, it takes 1.27 years for firms below the
threshold to reach the optimal while it takes
3.57 years for firms above the optimal level.
Accordingly, our results show that downward adjustment speed is lower than upward
adjustment speed which is consistent with
Rehman et al. (2016) and siddiqua et al. (2019).
We can say that these findings confirm our hypothesis that downward adjustment speed toward the optimal threshold level is higher than
upward adjustment speed.
Regarding corporate cash determinants, our
results indicate that net working capital, size
and growth have a significant and negative relationship with cash holding. The negative re56
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lationship between cash and size indicates that
smaller firms tend to hold more cash to finance
their activities as they tend to have unfavourable terms accessing other forms of external
financing. This is in line with the trade-off theory and empirically proven by previous studies
(Akben-Selcuk & Altiok-Yilmaz, 2017; Bates
et al., 2009; Pinkowitz & Williamson, 2001).
Similarly, firms with liabilities due in short
term tend to hold more cash to honour their financial obligations confirming the predictions
of the trade-off theory (Artica et al., 2016).
Also, Ferreira & Vilela (2004) suggest that net
working capital can be used as a substitute for
cash which can easily be converted to cash confirming the negative relationship between cash
holding and net working capital. Finally, firms
with growth opportunities tend to hold less
cash. Our results do not confirm previous studies linking growth opportunities with extra cash
holding and rising agency costs (Opler et al.,
1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Rehman et al.,
2016; Siddiqua et al., 2019).
To test for the validity of our estimation,
we have conducted Hansen and Arellano-Bond
tests which yielded statistically insignificant
results for all our samples. Note that Sargan
tests for robustness of model and Abond tests
for second-order autocorrelation and it has confirmed the absence of second-order autocorrelation in the model.

Conclusions
The present paper tried to investigate the existence of an optimal cash level for the MENA
region countries. According to the trade-off theory, the existence of an optimal levels lies on the
case where holding cash comes with costs and
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Table 9. Determinants of Variable CASH and Speed of Adjustment
Variables
CASH_L1
NWC
SIZE
SG
LEV
CAPEX
_Cons
Adj. rate (1−ρ)
Arellano-Bond test for
AR(2)
Hansen test
Observations

Coefficients
Overall Firms
0.8754
(182.78)***
-0.0025
(-8.73)***
-0.0017
(-5.40)***
-0.0001
(-4.81)***
-0.0001
(-1.68)
0.0034
(0.31)
0.0298
(5.85)***
≈ 0.1246

CASHi,t ≤ 0.68%
0.2121
(132.52)***
-0.0001
(-2.80)***
-0.0003
(-3.41)***
-0.0010
(-14.75)***
0.0002
(7.96)***
0.0060
(8.01)***
0.0043
(5.46)***
≈ 0.7879

0.68% < CASHi,t ≤ 25.88%
0.5848
(76.72)***
0.0010
(1.83)*
-0.0031
(-5.68)***
-0.0001
(-2.80)***
0.0004
(3.30)***
-0.0646
(-8.39)***
0.0811
(13.34)***
≈ 0.4152

CASHi,t > 25.88%
0.7192
(6.32)***
0.0063
(0.17)
-0.0019
(-0.16)
0.1910
(1.77)
0.1245
(0.54)
-0.2010
(-0.59)
0.1837
(1.19)
≈ 0.2808

0.070

0.247

0.160

0.298

0.255

0.998

0.341

1.000

880

176

651

53

Notes: GMM is Arellano and Bond estimation. t-test values are given in parentheses. CASH _L1 is the lagged cash variable. SIZE represents
company size; SG represents company growth. LEV represents company leverage. NWC represents net working capital. CAPEX represents
capital expenditure. *** indicates significance at 1%; * indicates significance at 10%.
Source: Authors’ estimate (2020)

benefits. Hence, the point where firm’s value is
maximized corresponds to the optimal point of
the concave function between cash holding and
firm’s value. Hence, our study used the model
developed by Hansen (1999) to estimate the optimal levels of cash within four countries of the
MENA region from 2007 to 2018. Accordingly,
we have used the return on assets (ROA) as a
proxy for firm’s value and the ratio of money
and cash equivalents on total assets (CASH) to
estimate corporate cash levels.
The empirical results show the existence of
a double-threshold for listed companies on the
MENA region. The coefficient is positive which
implies that cash levels above this level would
improve the company’s efficiency. The coefficient tends to decrease when approaching a
certain level which limits the efficiency potential of corporate managers. Consequently, our
results prove the existence of a nonlinear relationship between cash holding and firm’s value.
These results are consistent with previous empirical studies confirming the trade-off theory
between the marginal costs and benefits of cash
(Opler et al., 1999; Azmat, 2014; Nguyen et al.,
2016; Nguyen, 2019).
The findings in this paper contribute to the

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol13/iss1/4
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v13i1.12840

literature on cash policy. Indeed, a large growing number of empirical studies have been conducted on cash determinants and optimal cash
adjustment on different countries but much less
have investigated these issues in the case of the
MENA region. The main managerial implication for this paper comes from the empirical confirmation on the existence of two optimal cash
levels which maximises the firm’s value. The
fact that 72% of companies forming our sample
are within the threshold level explains much of
the manager’s behaviour towards holding cash.
Therefore, companies should constantly adjust
their cash level within the threshold regions in
order to improve their efficiency.
We have also applied a dynamic model to investigate the partial adjustment of listed MENA
firms toward the optimal cash. Our results
confirm that there is partial adjustment movement toward the optimal threshold level and
that downward adjustment speed is lower than
upward adjustment speed which is consistent
with Rehman et al. (2016) and siddiqua et al.
(2019). Additionally, we find that size, growth
and net working capital are statistically significant and negatively related to cash holding.
Eventually, both our hypothesis about the non-
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linear relationship between cash holding and
firm’s performance and the existence of partial
adjustment costs toward the optimal cash were
confirmed.
Implications and Research Limitations
The main implication of our study is to offer
corporate policy makers with an overall view of
cash holding behaviour in emerging countries
namely the MENA region. Our study combined
both the investigation of optimal level, cash
adjustment and corporate cash determinants.
Future research may explore the existence of
an optimal cash level considering the issue of
endogeneity as our study used a non-dynamic
model. Indeed, the use of a dynamic model to
determine the optimal level may give rigorous
results on corporate cash level.
Furthermore, previous studies like (T. L. H.
Nguyen et al., 2016; Siddiqua et al., 2019) have
either investigated the optimal level through a
non-linear relationship or test individually for
partial adjustments. On the contrary, our paper
both mobilized the threshold and dynamic model
to assist managers understanding corporate

cash behaviour. Results also confirm that firms
in emerging countries also adjust their cash
holding according to the different independent
variables used in the model. In addition to that,
managers do follow their value maximisation
goal through partial cash adjustment to meet
the optimal levels. Finally, this paper confirms
previous studies on the existence of a nonlinear relationship between cash holding and
firm value (Martinez-Sola et al., 2013; Azmat,
2014; T. Nguyen et al., 2016).
Our research use panel threshold regression
to estimate the optimal level which is a non-dynamic model. Thus, further studies might suggest using extended threshold panel to take into
consideration the problems of endogeneity. In
addition to that, the cash determinants equation
used lacks some key variables mainly corporate
governance variables. Indeed, the integration
of corporate governance shall provide policy
makers with a greater visibility on cash holding
decision. The same comment includes sectorial
analysis through using industry dummy variables to dig further on corporate cash behavioural in developing countries.

References
Abor, J. (2005). The effect of capital structure
on profitability: An empirical analysis of
listed firms in Ghana. The Journal of Risk
Finance, 6, 438–445.
Akben-Selcuk, E., & Altiok-Yilmaz, A. (2017).
Determinants of Corporate Cash Holdings:
Firm Level Evidence from Emerging Markets. In Global Business Strategies in Crisis.
Springer International Publishing.
Artica, R., Brufman, L., & Sagui, N. (2016).
Why do Latin American frms hold so much
more cash than they used to? Annual Meeting of the Argentine Association of Political
Economy, Tucumán, Argentina.
Ashhari, Z. M., & Faizal, D. R. (2018). DETERMINANTS AND PERFORMANCE OF
CASH HOLDING: EVIDENCE FROM
SMALL BUSINESS IN MALAYSIA. 2, 18.
Azmat, Q. (2014). Firm value and optimal cash
level: Evidence from Pakistan. International
58
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2021

Journal of Emerging Markets, 9(4), 488–
504.
Bates, T., Kahle, K., & Stulz, R. (2009). Why
do U.S. Firms Hold so MuchMore Cash
Than they Used to. Journal of Finance,
64(5), 1985–2021.
Cahyono, H. K. H., Hanafi, M., & Setiyono,
B. (2019). The optimal cash holdings speed
of adjustment and firm value: An empirical
study in Indonesia. Jurnal Keuangan Dan
Perbankan, 23(2), 246–257.
Dittmar, A., & Mahrt-Smith, J. (2007). Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash
Holdings. Journal of Financial Economics,
83, 293–324.
Ferreira, M. A., & Vilela, A. (2004). Why Do
Firms Hold Cash? Evidence from EMU
Countries. European Financial Management, 10, 295–319.
Guangming, G., & Fang, W. (2013). Research

11

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [2021], Art. 4
A. Raghibi, C. N. Thanh, and L. Oubdi/ Indonesian Capital Market Review 13 (2021) 48-60

of Corporate Governance Levels and Cash
Holdings Dynamic Adjustment Behavior.
2013 Third International Conference on
Intelligent System Design and Engineering Applications, 1110–1115. https://doi.
org/10.1109/ISDEA.2012.262
Gunney, Y., Ozkan, A., & Ozkan, N. (2003).
Additional international evidence on corporate cash holdings. EFMA Helsinki meetings, Helsinki.
Hansen, B. (1999). Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: Estimation, testing, and inference. Journal of Econometrics, 93, 345–368.
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2008). A Theory of
Board Control and Size. Review of Financial
Studies, 21(4), 1797–1832.
Im, K. S., Pesaran, H., & Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels.
Journal of Econometrics, 115, 53–74.
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash
flow, corporate finance and takeovers. Amerian Economic Review, 76, 323–329.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of
Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.
Jiang, Z., & Lie, E. (2016). Cash holding adjustments and managerial entrenchment.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 36, 190–205.
Kalcheva, I., & Lins, K. V. (2003). International
Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected
Managerial Agency Problems. Working Paper, SSRN.
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money (3rd ed.).
Macmillan Cambridge University Press.
Kim, C.-S., Maer, D. C., & Sherman, A. E.
(1998). The Determinants pf Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33,
305–334.
Levin, A., Chien-Fu, L., & Chia-Shang, J.
(2002). Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and finite-sample properties. Journal of
Econometrics, 108, 1–24.
Lian, Y., Xu, Y., & Zhou, K. (2012). How and
Why Do Firms Adjust Their Cash Holdings toward Targets? Evidence from China.
Front. Bus. Res. China, 6(4), 527–560.

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol13/iss1/4
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v13i1.12840

Liedgren, G., & Carlsson, P. (2009). Cash holdings in Sweden—A Corporate Governance
Perspective [Master Thesis]. Lund University.
Martinez-Sola, C., & Garcia-Teruel, P. J.
(2011). Corporate Cash Holding and Firm
Value. Applied Economics, 45(2), 161–170.
Martinez-Sola, C., Garcia-Teruel, P. J., & Martinez-Solano, P. (2013). Corporate Cash
Holding and Firm Value. Journal of Applied
Economics, 45(2), 161–170.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1958). The cost of
capital corporation, Finance and the theory
of Investment. American Economic Review,
48(3), 261–297.
Mohamed, T. (2020). Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway has the cash to buy Tesla,
Starbucks, or McDonald’s after the coronavirus sell-off | Markets Insider. Markets Businessinsider. https://markets.businessinsider.
com/news/stocks/warren-buffett-berkshirehathaway-buy-tesla-starbucks-mcdonaldscoronavirus-selloff-2020-3-1029041432#
Mulligan, C. (1997). Scale economies, the
value of time, and the demand for money:
Longitudinal evidence from firms. Journal
of Political Economy, 105, 1061–1079.
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of Corporate
Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147–175.
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate
Financing and Investment Decisions when
Frims Have Information that Investors Do
Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics,
13, 187–221.
Nguyen, T., Cai, C., & McColgan, P. (2016).
How firms manage their cash flows: An
examination of diversification’s effect. Rev
Quant Finance Account, 48(3), 701–724.
Nguyen, Thanh Cuong. (2019). Optimal Cash
Holding Ratio for Non-Financial Firms in
Vietnam Stock Exchange Market. Journal
of Risk and Financial Management, 12(2),
1-13. https://doi:10.3390/jrfm12020104
Nguyen, T. L. H., Nguyen, L. N. T., & Le, T.
P. V. (2016). Firm Value, Corporate Cash
Holdings and Financial Constraint: A Study
from a Developing Market. Australian Economic Papers, 55(4), 368–385. https://doi.

59
12

Raghibi et al.: Optimal level, Partial Speed of Adjustment and Determinants of Co
A. Raghibi, C. N. Thanh, and L. Oubdi/ Indonesian Capital Market Review 13 (2021) 48-60

org/10.1111/1467-8454.12082
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., & Williamson, R.
(1999). The Determinants and Implications
of Corporate Cash Holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 52(1), 3–46.
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., & Williamson, R.
(2001). Corporate Cash holdings. Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, 14(1).
Ozkan, A., & Ozkan, N. (2004). Corporate
Cash Holdings: An Empirical Investogation
on UK companies. Journal of Banking and
Finance, 28, 2103–2134.
Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., & Williamson, R.
(2006). Does the contribution of corporate
cash holdings and dividends to firm value
depend on governance? A cross-country
analysis. Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2725–
2751.
Pinkowitz, L., & Williamson, R. (2001). Bank
Power and Cash Holdings: Evidence from
Japan. Review of Financial Studies, 14(4),
1059–1082.
Rehman, A., Wang, M., & Kabiraj, S. (2016).
Dynamics of corporate cash holdings in
Chinese firms: An empirical investigation
of asymmetric adjustment rate and financial
constraints. Asian Academy of Management
Journal of Accounting & Finance, 12(2),
27–152.

60
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2021

Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large
Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy, 95, 461–488.
Siddiqua, G., Rehman, A., & Hussain, S.
(2019). Asymmetric targeting of corporate
cash holdings and financial constraints in
Pakistani firms. Journal of Asian Business
and Economic Studies, 26(1), 76–97.
Tahir, M. S., Alifiah, M. N., Arshad, M. U., &
Saleem, F. (2016). Financial Theories with
a Focus on Corporate Cash Holding Behavior: A Comprehensive Review. 6, 5.
Tong, Z. (2011). Firm diversification and the
value of corporate cash holdings. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 17(3), 741–758.
Venkiteshwaran, V. (2011). Partial adjustment
toward optimal cash holding levels. Review
of Financial Economics, 20(3), 113–121.
Vijayakumaran, R., & Atchyuthan, N. (2017).
Cash holdings and corporate performance:
Evidence from Sri Lanka. International
Journal of Accounting & Business Finance,
3, 1–11.
Zhang, S., & Ling, T. (2016). Cash Holding and
Firm Value: Evidence from the US Market
from 1999 to 2015 [Master Thesis]. Faculty
of Business Administration, Simon Fraser
University.

13

